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I. INTRODUCTION
The Reconstruction Congress passed section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (Act), commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act,1 to com-
bat racial violence in the South where local police officers, in violation
of the victims' constitutional rights, often failed to protect blacks from
attacks by lynch mobs.2 Although section 1 protects all citizens regard-
less of race, it was designed primarily to (1) prevent states from passing
racially discriminatory laws, (2) provide blacks with redress for depriva-
tions of civil rights when state law proved inadequate, and (3) enable
victims to sue in federal court when state law remedies were, in prac-
tice, unavailable to blacks.' Currently codified at section 1983 of Title
42 of the United States Code,4 section I does not create any substantive
1. The Act was entitled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution to the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13 (1871). For the text of
§ 1 as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), see infra note 4.
2. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled, Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1325-28 (1952). See generally Note, Municipal Liability Under Section
1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUm. L. REv. 304, 308-09 (1979). Today, police
officers acting in good faith are entitled to immunity from suit under § 1983. See Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (holding that an
officer was entitled to summary judgment if it was established as a matter of law that a reasonable
officer could have believed the search was lawful). Also, the Act does not apply to state or federal
governments. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
3. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74; see also Burke & Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REv.
511, 512-13 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. The criminal counterpart to § 1983 for willful deprivations under color of law is 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1988), which provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects
any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by
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rights. Instead, it provides a private right of action in federal court for
the deprivation of federally protected rights.'
Since its passage, section 1983 has evolved into an all-purpose rem-
edy for victims of official abuse. Whenever a local government violates a
person's federally protected rights, the victim can sue the officer and
the governmental entity for money damages under section 1983.6
Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for deprivations caused by
federal actors or by states.' In 1978, however, the United States Su-
preme Court approved the recovery of damages directly from a munici-
pality that ultimately was found responsible for the plaintiff's
deprivation.8 Section 1983 has become an effective means of redress for
victims of official abuse and, consequently, appears to have altered the
behavior of police, who frequently are placed in confrontational situa-
tions in which deprivations are most likely to occur." A municipality,
however, is not automatically liable when one of its officers or employ-
ees causes a deprivation.10 This Note considers when a municipality is
and should be liable for deprivations caused by its officers.
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury
results shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if
death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id.
5. Congress enacted § 1983 pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, US. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article"), to provide a private right of action in federal court. City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140,
144 & n.3 (1979)); see also Note, Municipal Liability Under City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle:
Federalism, Due Process, and the Implications of a Restricted Section 1983 Remedy, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 733, 733 & n.3 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality decision). This
Note does not discuss recovery from the officer because the prospect of recovery is insignificant
compared to recovery from the governmental entity. See infra notes 23-29, and accompanying text.
In any case, the officer may not be liable if he acted in good faith. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 555-57 (1967). The municipality, however, cannot claim the officer's good faith as a defense.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
7. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
8. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. This Note does not suggest that police officers are inclined to violate the rights of others;
rather, it recognizes that they often are placed in situations that are more likely to result in depri-
vations. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 60-61 (1983). Studies suggest that § 1983 has
prompted police departments to screen, train, and supervise their police officers more carefully,
and to separate unfit officers from public contact. One study suggests that civil actions, including
those under § 1983, have halved the number of citizens killed by police in major metropolitan
areas. See Note, A Foreseeability-Based Standard for the Determination of Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983, 28 B.C.L. REv. 937, 978 & n.420 (1987) (citing Amicus Curiae Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts at 28-35, Kibbe v.
City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985) (No. 85-1217), cert. denied per curiam as improvi-
dently granted, 480 U.S. 257 (1987)).
10. See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 469 (plurality decision).
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Section 1983 litigation is considered a species of tort law.11 Under
the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for
the tortious acts of his employee performed within the scope of employ-
ment."2 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected respondeat superior
as a basis for section 1983 liability.'3 The Court reasoned that a munici-
pality should be liable only when it is at fault, meaning that the
municipality itself, not a mere employee, must deprive the plaintiff of a
federally protected right for municipal liability to ensue.14 The Court
has determined that a municipality causes a deprivation only when the
deprivation results from a decision made by a municipal official with
final authority to make such decisions, a rule known as the final author-
ity doctrine.' 5 Therefore, if a police officer conducts an illegal search,
the municipality is not liable unless the officer acts in conformity with
instructions from a municipal official with final authority over the pro-
cedures governing police searches or, alternatively, if the search is con-
ducted in a manner consistent with customary police practices, even if
unauthorized. 6
Determining liability for illegal conduct by a municipal employee
requires first determining whether the municipality has authorized the
act either directly or indirectly.' 7 If so, the municipality is liable." If
the act was not authorized, the municipality is not liable. 9 If similar
acts occur often enough, however, even if not expressly authorized, the
conduct may be deemed authorized, and the municipality may be lia-
ble.2 0 Although the Supreme Court consistently has applied the final
authority doctrine when considering municipal liability under section
1983, the Court has been unable to reach consensus on how the doctrine
should be applied, even when general agreement exists as to the proper
result in a particular case.2
11. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
13. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also infra subpart 1II(B).
14. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95 & n.57.
15. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality decision).
16. See, e.g., id. at 140 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. See infra subpart IV(B).
18. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112 (plurality decision); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 469 (plu-
rality decision); see also Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of
Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 898 (1986) (stating that the Supreme
Court cannot reach a consensus on the application of the final authority doctrine). See generally
Brown, supra, at 884 (stating that the final authority doctrine "may well make sense, but in opera-
tion it is a quicksand of uncertainty").
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After a brief overview of individual and governmental liability
under section 1983 in Part II, Part III of this Note explores the basis
for the Court's disagreement on how to apply the final authority doc-
trine. Part IV submits that the doctrine's underlying rationale is to pre-
clude municipal liability for random and unauthorized conduct.22 Part
V reviews principal cases in light of the underlying rationale.
This Note submits that because the underlying rationale exempli-
fies the concerns present in all cases of municipal liability under section
1983-not just procedural due process claims-the Court could attain
consistency by determining final authority, and therefore liability, in
accordance with the doctrine's rationale. In sum, the rationale underly-
ing the final authority doctrine should provide an anchor point for the
rules that will develop as the courts revisit this area. Adherence to the
rationale for the doctrine in each case will lead to a formulation of the
final authority doctrine that is more consistent with the purpose of im-
posing municipal liability for deprivations of federally protected rights
by municipal officers and employees.
II. INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
To recover under section 1983 a plaintiff must show that "(1) a
person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected the plaintiff or
caused the plaintiff to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."23 When an
individual acting "under color of state law"2 deprives another of a fed-
erally protected right, the actor may be personally liable under section
1983.2' The plaintiff, however, may be dissatisfied with an action
22. This rationale may sound familiar-it is the rule applied in § 1983 claims for procedural
due process violations. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
23. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Note, supra note 9, at 961.
24. Generally, a person acts "under color of state law" when the person exercises a right or
privilege created by the state and fairly can be called a state actor. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The Supreme Court has developed various tests for determining when a
person is a state actor. See id. (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (using the
"joint action" test); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (using the "nexus"
test); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (using the "public function" test);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (using the "state compulsion" test)).
25. Members of the executive branch are entitled to qualified immunity, which shields the
individual from liability when acting in good faith. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967)
(granting the "defense of good faith and probable cause" to an officer in a § 1983 action). Members
of the legislative and judicial branches are entitled to absolute immunity for official actions. See
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (involving
local legislators); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (concerning judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (involving prosecutors); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972) (concerning federal legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (concerning state
legislators). But see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (holding that a judge is not entitled to
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against the individual because of the reluctance of many juries to find
against the typical defendant-a police officer portrayed by his attorney
as hard working and underpaid.26 Even if a jury does find that an officer
is liable, it is likely to limit damages based on a perception of the de-
fendant's inability to pay a large award." Sympathy for an offending
officer is less likely to sway a jury in an action against the municipality
itself,28 and the municipality probably will pay any award.29 Even if an
individual is found liable, though, recovery from the governmental en-
tity will not follow automatically. The analysis of governmental liability
depends first on whether the individual acted under color of federal,
state, or local law.
Section 1983 applies only to deprivations caused by those acting
under color of state or local law.3 0 Thus, a deprivation under color of
federal law does not create liability for the individual or the federal
government under section 1983.1 Individuals cannot sue states under
section 1983 because states are not "persons" within the meaning of the
statute.2 The Supreme Court has determined, however, that municipal-
ities3 3 are "persons" subject to suit under section 1983 for deprivations
caused by employees or agents.3 The remainder of this Note addresses
municipal liability under section 1983.
absolute immunity for administrative acts); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (stating that
judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer). See gener-
ally Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833
(1978) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Stump). Thus, recovery from the individual
may be unlikely.
26. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Dam-
age Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456 (1978).
27. See id. at 456-57. In many cases the municipality will indemnify the employee for any
damage award, but the jury will not be told of this. Id.
28. A jury is likely to consider an official policy case as more serious. See Taylor, Municipal
Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases from Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19 CumB.
L. REV. 447, 464 (1989).
29. See Newman, supra note 26, at 456.
30. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988).
31. The Supreme Court has recognized a similar right to sue persons acting under color of
federal law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens actions are subject to different rules and will not be considered further here.
32. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
33. A "municipality" is a city, town, borough, county, or similar local governmental entity.
See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (counties are subject to suit under § 1983);
0. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 7, at 19-20, 23-24 (1982); Frug, The
City As a Legal Concept, 93 HAv. L. REV. 1059, 1061 & n.4 (1980).
34. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658; see also infra subpart 11(A).
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III. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Municipalities Are "Persons" Subject to Suit Under Section
1983
The Supreme Court found in Monroe v. Papes5 that Congress did
not intend to impose liability on municipalities under section 1983.36
The Court held, therefore, that municipalities are not "persons" within
the meaning of the statute.3 7 The Court based its determination of in-
tent chiefly on Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1871,38 which would have imposed liability on a mu-
nicipality for damages to property or persons caused by lawless mobs.39
According to the Court, Congress rejected the amendment because it
concluded that it lacked the constitutional power to impose civil liabil-
ity on municipalities.'
The Supreme Court later reconsidered the status of a municipality
under section 1983 in Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services.41 After another review of the legislative history of the Sher-
man amendment, as well as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
the Court overruled Monroe by holding that Congress did intend to in-
clude local governmental entities as "persons" subject to liability under
section 1983.42 To ensure that municipalities would not defeat the rule
of Monell, the Court further held that a municipality was not entitled
to absolute immunity.43 After removing the shields that had protected
municipalities for so long, the Court proceeded to define the character
and scope of municipal liability under section 1983.
35. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Thirteen Chicago police officers entered the plaintiff's home without an arrest or search
warrant, ransacked his home, and terrorized him and his family. 365 U.S. at 169. The police held
the plaintiff in custody for 10 hours for interrogation about a two-day-old murder. Id. He was
never brought before a magistrate and subsequently was released without being charged. Id.
36. Id. at 167.
37. Id.
38. 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-92.
40. Id. at 190.
41. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The New York Department of Social Services and Department of
the City Board of Education adopted a policy that required pregnant employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence after the fifth month of pregnancy, which is before it is medically necessary. Id.
at 660-61 & n.2.
42. Id. at 690.
43. Id. at 701.
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B. The Basis of Liability: The Supreme Court Rejects Respondeat
Superior
The Supreme Court's rejection of absolute immunity potentially
could have made municipalities liable for any deprivation of federal
rights by their employees if the Court had continued to follow tradi-
tional tort law principles in determining section 1983 liability.4 4 The
Court in Monell, however, rejected the imposition of respondeat supe-
rior,"5 a traditional aspect of tort law.46 In doing so, the Court narrowed
the potentially enormous scope of municipal liability by requiring some
finding of fault on the part of the local governmental entity before lia-
bility may be imposed.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior a master is liable for the
negligent and intentional torts of his servant, even if the master was not
negligent, and even if the master did everything possible to prevent the
tort."1 As long as the servant is intending to further the objectives of his
employment, his master is vicariously liable.49 The application of re-
spondeat superior to section 1983 actions against municipalities would
make them liable for virtually all torts committed by their employees.
The Court in Monell identified two traditional justifications for re-
spondeat superior: To reduce accidents by giving employers a financial
incentive to control the acts of employees, and to spread the risk of loss
among the community.50 The Court then offered two principal ration-
ales for rejecting respondeat superior. First, the text of section 1983
states that a person is liable only for the deprivations that the person
causes,51 and a municipality does not cause a deprivation merely by em-
ploying a tortfeasor.52 Second, application of respondeat superior under
section 1983 unconstitutionally would impose a duty on the municipal-
44. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (noting that § 1979, the precursor to § 1983, "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions").
45. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
46. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEErON].
47. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985) (plurality decision) (stating
that Monell requires a fault-based analysis for determining municipal liability); id. at 831 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (stating that a municipality is not at fault for deprivations it could not have
prevented). See generally Brown, supra note 21, at 897 (stating that Tuttle "recast Monell as
establishing a fault-based approach to municipal liability under section 1983").
48. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 46, § 69, at 499.
49. See id. § 70, at 505.
50. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94. Proponents offered similar justifications for the rejected
Sherman amendment that would have imposed liability on a municipality for acts of persons who
are not employees of the municipality. The Court found that rejection of the amendment demon-
strated Congress's rejection of those justifications. See id.
51. See supra note 4.
52. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92.
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ity to provide services.5 "
Section 1983 is a species of tort law that generally embodies tort
law principles. 54 By rejecting respondeat superior, however, the court
withdrew from section 1983 plaintiffs the traditional basis for finding
vicarious liability. This rejection required the adoption of another rule
to determine when a municipality is vicariously liable.55 The Monell
Court expressly left open the development of such a rule,56 but did pro-
vide some guidelines for determining municipal liability.
C. The Substitute for Respondeat Superior: The Final Authority
Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Monell stated that a municipality is liable
for deprivations caused by employees or agents in the course of execut-
ing a municipal policy or custom. 57 Such a policy or custom could be
made either by lawmakers or by those vested with the authority to
make official policy.55 The Court concluded that an official policy of the
Department of Social Services and the New York City Board of Educa-
tion compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence
before it was medically necessary" unquestionably caused the constitu-
53. Id. at 693. The Court noted that Congress found that imposing a duty to keep the peace
was unconstitutional. Id. The Constitution imposes a duty on a state to provide services only for
those persons it has taken into custody against their will. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). Respondeat superior, however, requires pro-
tection of those persons with whom one has entered into a special relationship. See PROSSER &
KEEToN, supra note 46, § 70, at 506. The Court presumably infers that the Sherman amendment
would create such a special relationship, rather than a constitutional duty.
Some commentators have criticized the Court's rejection of respondeat superior. See, e.g.,
Comment, Vicarious Municipal Liability; Creating a Consistent Remedial Policy for Local Gov-
ernment Violations of Civil Rights, 16 CAL. W.L. Rav. 58 (1980) (arguing for respondeat superior).
See generally Brown, supra note 21, at 892-96 (summarizing the commentary). The commentators
note that the justifications for adopting respondeat superior-making employers more careful and
spreading risk-are as applicable to municipalities as to private companies. See generally id. Other
commentators argue that a municipality should have a duty to provide services. See generally id.
The Court's rejection of respondeat superior is considered below in light of the underlying ration-
ale for the final authority doctrine, which the Court adopted in place of respondeat superior. See
infra subpart II(C).
54. See supra note 44. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages, another traditional
aspect of tort law.
55. See Brown, supra note 21, at 896-98 (noting that the Monell Court "may have settled on
official policy by a process of elimination").
56. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 661. The district court had determined that the policy was unconstitutional
under Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Monell, 436 U.S. at 661-62
(citing 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
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tional violation in MonellY° After Monell the Court routinely has im-
posed liability on a municipality when an official decision made by the
lawmakers caused the deprivation."
A more difficult case is presented when an individual city employee
causes the deprivation. A plurality of the Supreme Court in Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnatie2 found that a deprivation caused by the decision of
any municipal official, not just the city council, is sufficient to impose
liability on the municipality if that official possessed final authority to
make policy in that area of the city's business. 3 Later, the plurality in
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik64 stated that as long as the decision is in
an area in which the official or body could have made policy governing
future municipal conduct, the decision should be treated as that of the
60. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
61. See, e.g., Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 247 (holding municipality liable after the city
council revoked concert permit for content-based reasons); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622 (1980) (finding municipal liability after city council fired chief of police without a pretermina-
tion hearing).
The Court has not required that lawmakers adopt a rule of generalized application because
even the first and only victim of the illegal policy should be entitled to recovery. See Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-85 (1986). Therefore, a decision that would apply only to a
single incident is sufficient to impose liability. See id. at 480. The Court thus has determined that
a "policy" does not mean a rule of generalized application-it means a choice from among various
alternatives. Id. at 481-84 & n.9.
62. 475 U.S. at 481-83 (plurality decision).
63. See id. at 481-84 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ.). Deputy sheriffs attempting to serve capiases at the plaintiff's office were not allowed to
enter. Id. at 472. The deputies requested instructions from the assistant prosecutor, who told them
to go in and get the suspects. Id. at 472-73. The deputies chopped down the plaintiff's door with an
axe, but did not find the suspects. Id. at 473. The district court held this to be a violation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments under Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 474-75.
If a city council establishes an employment policy delegating the discretion to hire and fire
police department employees to the chief of police, as long as the city retained the power to re-
verse the chief's illegal employment decisions, the city would not be liable if the chief exercised the
authority in violation of federal law because his decisions are not decisions of the city council. See,
e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 140 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)). If, however, the chief of police is
given final authority to make such decisions, so that they cannot be reversed by the city council,
those decisions can give rise to city liability. See, e.g., id. See generally Case Note, Under the Civil
Rights Act, Municipal Liability May Be Imposed for a Single Decision by Municipal Policymak-
ers Under Appropriate Circumstances-Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 465
(1987); Case Comment, Municipal Liability Extended to Include Single Acts of Official Deci-
sionmakers-Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 237 (1987).
The key to determining whether an official has final authority seems to be whether decisions
made by that official are reviewable by the city council or another body of local government. Lower
courts have found, for example, that not even the chief of police has final authority in the area of
police work because the mayor, as the chief executive, can review the chief's decisions. See, e.g.,
Lacey v. Borough of Darby, 618 F. Supp. 331, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
64. 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality decision).
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municipality.6 5
The Court's rejection of respondeat superior stems from the belief
that a municipality should be held liable only when it is at fault.6 A
municipality is not at fault for merely employing a tortfeasor,e7 but only
if, as articulated in Monell, the deprivation results from the municipal-
ity's official policies.6 8 A plaintiff may recover only for injuries resulting
from acts officially sanctioned by the municipality. 9 The Court in
Pembaur found that decisions of the municipal lawmaking body cer-
tainly constitute official sanctioning. "° Likewise, decisions of individual
officials with the authority to dictate official policy also are deemed to
be official policy. 1 Consequently, the Court in Pembaur articulated the
final authority doctrine, stating that liability attaches to a municipality
when an official with the final responsibility for the subject matter at
issue created the policy that caused the deprivation.7 2 The Court thus
replaced the traditional rule of respondeat superior with the final au-
thority doctrine.
IV. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE FINAL AUTHORITY DOCTRINE:
THE MUNICIPALITY Is NOT LIABLE FOR RANDOM AND UNAUTHORIZED
CONDUCT
Since the development of the final authority doctrine, the Court
has been unable to agree on how to apply the new rule. The disagree-
65. See id. at 140 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, and
Scalia, JJ.). James Praprotnik was a city architect who claimed he was fired in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments in retaliation for appealing his suspension. Id. at 114-17 (plurality
decision).
66. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 139 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
658).
68. See, e.g., id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted in Praprotnik
that the official policy doctrine as such is intended "'to distinguish acts of the municipality from
acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.'" Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80).
Justice Brennan suggested in Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring), that the mu-
nicipality must be at fault to be liable. This proposition leads to the question of what constitutes
fault in this context. Is a municipality at fault merely for creating the police department that
employed the officer who acted illegally, or must the city council actually review and approve the
decision? See, e.g., id. at 823 (plurality opinion); id. at 833 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring). Imposing
liability on the basis of fault essentially begs the question of when a municipality should be liable.
69. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
70. Id. (citing Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 247 (stating that "City Council canceled li-
cense permitting concert because of dispute over content of performance") and Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (stating that the "City Council passed resolution firing plaintiff
without a pretermination hearing")).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 483-84.
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ment apparently stems not from any fundamental differences about
when the rule should apply, but from a failure to state clearly why the
final authority doctrine is the proper way to determine fault. This Note
suggests that the final authority doctrine determines fault appropriately
by requiring that those ultimately responsible be on notice of an im-
pending deprivation before liability can attach. If the municipality is on
notice and fails to prevent the deprivation, then it is at fault.
Requiring notice insulates the municipality from liability for the
random and unauthorized conduct of its agents. If conduct is author-
ized, notice is not a factor, and the municipality should be liable.75 On
the other hand, if conduct is random and not authorized, notice is a
problem, and the municipality generally will not be liable. If the con-
duct is sufficiently widespread so that it would not be considered ran-
dom, however, the municipality is arguably on notice. Therefore,
certain widespread conduct should be deemed authorized, making the
municipality liable for any resulting deprivation.
A. Borrowed from Due Process Cases
This underlying rationale, based on the principle of notice, is bor-
rowed from cases addressing actions for violations of procedural due
process brought under section 1983. For example, in Parratt v. Taylore4
the Court stated that the loss of an inmate's property because of the
negligence of prison guards was the result of random and unauthorized
conduct. 5 Because the loss did not result from a state procedure, the
state could not predict when the loss would occur.76 Therefore, the state
could not provide a predeprivation hearing. 7 The state consequently
did not violate fourteenth amendment procedural due process because
it provided the prisoner with as much process as was possible; in this
case a postdeprivation hearing was sufficient to satisfy the requisites of
due process.78
The notice rationale applies equally well in determining municipal
73. The following chart depicts when § 1983 should impose liability on a municipality.
Random Not random
Authorized Always Always
Unauthorized Never Only if custom
or usage
74. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
75. See id. at 541.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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liability under section 1983.79 It also appears to be the underlying ra-
tionale for the Court's rejection of respondeat superior, which would
not require notice, and the adoption of the final authority rule, which
does require notice. After setting forth the details of this rationale, this
Note reviews the cases that created disagreement among the Justices of
the Supreme Court. The review demonstrates how adherence to the un-
derlying rationale can resolve the differences among the Justices in the
application of the final authority doctrine.
B. What Is Authorized: The Municipal Power Structure
The final authority doctrine imposes liability on the municipality
for all authorized conduct.80 To determine what constitutes authorized
conduct, one first must define the municipal power structure. This task
requires tracing the flow of municipal authority from the citizens who
must pay for municipal liability to the municipal employee who ulti-
mately inflicts the deprivation.81 The citizens of the municipality elect
persons who are entrusted with the power to spend the citizens' money
and to speak as the citizens' voice.2" In many municipalities, the com-
munity vests this power in an executive, typically the mayor, and in a
legislative branch, typically the city council.83
The executive and legislative branches represent the top tier of au-
thority and have the discretion to delegate power to subordinates. 4 The
top tier may find it useful to delegate complete authority to officials
with expertise in a particular area of the municipality's business.8 5
When the top tier delegates final authority to an official, by definition
the official receives the municipality's power in that area of the munici-
79. See, e.g., Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom Pol-
icy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L. REv. 101, 104 (1986) (stating that "[w]here
causation by the government ends, random and unauthorized acts of its employees begin").
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Brown, supra note 21, at 897.
82. See 0. REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 33, § 7, at 21-22; Brown, supra note 21, at 897.
83. In most states, municipalities derive their power from state statutes that enable them to
execute certain functions. See 0. REYNOLDS, Ja, supra note 33, § 49, at 135-39. Enabling statutes
often provide for the form of municipal government, typically calling for a mayor and a city coun-
cil. Id. § 7, at 49-50.
84. See id. § 56, at 161-62 (stating that a municipality must delegate tasks to its agents if it
is to function at all); id. § 57, at 166 (stating that the city council need not inspect and approve the
soil before a sewer pipe is installed; it can delegate that decision to the city engineer). The same
rules of delegation apply when the city council delegates power to its own committees. Id. § 57, at
168.
The citizens may elect other persons to represent them in specific areas of the municipality's
business, such as the water department or the school board. It follows that these representatives
are the top tier decisionmakers in those areas and likewise are empowered to delegate that author-
ity in their discretion.
85. See supra note 84.
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pality's business.86 The official thus has the power to act on behalf of
the municipality. When the top tier authority has not retained the
power to reverse a lower official's decisions, it is responsible for obliga-
tions the official creates for the municipality. 7 Therefore, the munici-
pality is liable when a person or body possessing final authority adopts
a policy that causes a deprivation of federally protected rights.88
Taxpayers enjoy a certain degree of safety because they typically
elect a legislative branch comprised of members empowered to act only
as a group, minimizing the possibility that the lawmaking branch will
act in a random and unpredictable way.89 When citizens elect a mayor
empowered to act individually, they increase the possibility of hasty ac-
tions and, consequently, increase the risk of municipal liability.90 In
that case the community's remedy is to elect a new mayor, but the elec-
torate can minimize the risk of illegal conduct by limiting the mayor's
authority, possibly by shifting more responsibility to the lawmaking
body for areas of municipal business with high potential for illegal
conduct."
The top tier has similar safeguards available to it when it delegates
authority. It can narrow the scope of an official's power,92 or it can re-
tain the authority to review and reverse any decision made, in effect
removing final authority.9 3 In any event, the top tier can fire the official
or remove the power if the official causes or appears likely to cause a
deprivation.
The municipality acts through this power structure.9 This struc-
ture is, therefore, the framework for analyzing whether the municipality
authorized policy so as to put itself at risk of liability. In sum, a munici-
pality is liable only for acts of the top tier authorities, or those granted
final authority from the top tier. The underlying rationale for the final
authority doctrine, however, also has a second component: randomness.
86. By definition an official with final authority possesses the power to make decisions that
cannot be changed by others. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality decision).
89. If legislation is arbitrary or whimsical, it is ultra vires and the municipality itself will not
be liable for it. See 0. REYNOLDS, J., supra note 33, § 53, at 153-54.
90. See generally infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
91. See generally supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. See 0. REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 33, § 57, at 170 (stating that the municipality should
not delegate unbridled power, but should circumscribe the power by reasonable legislative guide-
lines); see also infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
94. See 0. REYNOLDS, J., supra note 33, § 56, at 161 (stating that "[1]ike a private corpora-
tion, a municipal corporation can only act through its various officers and employees").
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C. Authorized and Random Conduct: Is the Municipality Liable for
Personally Motivated Acts by Final Decisionmakers?
A municipality may not be liable for acts of even a final deci-
sionmaker if the individual acts with personal or vengeful motives. The
Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue, and its existing decisions
provide little guidance on how the Court would resolve it. For example,
Justice William Brennan stated in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle9 5
that imposing municipal liability for the actions of a mentally unbal-
anced police officer would amount to respondeat superior, which the
Court consistently has rejected. In a footnote, however, Justice Brennan
emphasized that the individual was not a final decisionmaker but a low-
level police officer.9 6 Justice Brennan stated that the municipality may
not escape liability for actions of sufficiently high-ranking officials. 97
Would this impose a form of respondeat superior liability for all acts of
final decisionmakers?
The answer depends on whether the final decisionmaker is more
analogous to a master or a servant. If the final decisionmaker is more
like a master, the municipality would be liable for injuries the official
causes without respondeat superior. Conversely, if the role of the final
decisionmaker is more like that of a servant, holding the municipality
liable for injuries would be the equivalent of respondeat superior. The
question is best answered by putting aside these technical distinctions
and referring instead to the purpose of imposing liability on the
municipality.
The central goals of imposing municipal liability are to deter the
deprivation of federally protected rights and to compensate the victims
of those deprivations.98 Imposing liability for a personal or vengeful act
would not deter deprivations because the municipality cannot prevent
those acts except by not delegating any authority.9 Recovery against
the municipality for unauthorized conduct would be fortuitous for the
victim because the conduct is essentially a personal act, rather than an
act of the municipality."' 0 The core purposes of section 1983, however,
95. 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 830 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. See Note, supra note 9, at 976 & n.407 (citing Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Back-
ground" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 10-11 (1974)).
99. It may be impossible for the top tier to retain actual plenary review power over all
actions by the employees. See supra notes 84-86.
100. The individual may have used the instrumentalities of the municipality, but that is true
in the police brutality cases when liability is not imposed. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), overruled, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The ques-
tion of instrumentality asks whether the person was a state actor, not whether the governmental
entity was blameworthy. See id.
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probably preclude an exception from liability for personal or vengeful
conduct.
Section 1983 arguably was intended to compensate all victims of
official abuse. Congress enacted the predecessor to section 1983 to fight
racism by government officials-especially police officials who did not
attempt to stop racial violence by the Ku Klux Klan.10 1 Did those offi-
cials act on personal or vengeful motives? If hatred of blacks was not
personal, what was it? These considerations make it unlikely that the
Reconstruction Congress intended any exception for personally moti-
vated acts.
V. How AN OFFICIAL POLICY CAUSES A DEPRIVATION: THE PRINCIPAL
CASES VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE
A municipality is liable for deprivations caused by its official poli-
cies. A municipality makes official policy when: (1) the top tier author-
ity adopts a policy; (2) the top tier authority delegates final authority to
a subordinate who makes a policy; (3) either one falls to prevent a dep-
rivation that it could have prevented; or (4) a practice is so widespread
that it constitutes a custom or usage representing official policy.10 2
A. The Top Tier Authority Adopts a Policy
When the top tier authority of a municipality, typically the city
council, adopts a rule that causes a deprivation, the Supreme Court has
had little difficulty finding municipal liability even if the rule is applied
only once.103 Imposing liability on the city in this case is consistent with
the underlying rationale for the final authority doctrine because the
highest municipal authority authorized the conduct. The conduct rarely
is random because the lawmakers can act only as a group and must
follow established rules when adopting policies.10 4 Other top tier deci-
sionmakers typically possess final authority in areas of the municipal-
ity's business in which deprivations are less likely.105
101. See generally Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89
(1978).
102. See infra notes 103, 135-42, 152-60, 167-80 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (imposing liability
on the city after the city council revoked a concert permit for content-based reasons); Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (imposing liability on the city after the city council fired the
chief of police without a pretermination hearing). The Court often refers to this situation as the
easy case. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 658.
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 84.
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B. The Top Tier Authority Delegates Final Authority to a
Subordinate Official
When top tier authorities give policy-making authority to
subordinate officials-who then can hire, fire, and establish routines
and rules of conduct-the city risks liability because these decisions re-
quire sensitivity to federally protected rights and are likely to result in
deprivations. 106 The municipality is liable in delegation of authority
cases only if the decision constitutes an exercise of final authority; mere
exercises of discretion are not final decisions. 10 7 The distinction turns
on whether another authority could review the decision.10 8 Before that
issue can be resolved, however, it is necessary to determine the source
of the decisionmaker's power: must a statute grant the power to exer-
cise authority, or is it better to examine the facts of each case, making a
statutory grant just one factor? This crucial area of section 1983 munic-
ipal liability has been difficult and controversial. 0 9
1. Is Final Authority a Question of Law or Fact?
A plurality of the Supreme Court in City of St. Louis v. Praprot-
nik " 0 further limited municipal liability by deciding that state law de-
termines whether someone is a policy-making official."1  The
Praprotnik plurality stated that the fact finder is not free to place final
authority someplace other than where the law puts it." 2 The plurality
conceded that state law may not always be clear, but dismissed the dif-
ficulty by stating that the lower courts could resolve such issues.113
Making this question one of state law has the advantage of enabling
courts to dispose of some claims on summary judgment.""
106. See id.
107. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
108. See infra subpart V(B)(2).
109. Even the Supreme Court has been unable to produce a majority opinion. See infra notes
110-11 and accompanying text.
110. 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality decision). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced thejudgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and
Antonin Scalia. Id. at 114 (plurality opinion). Justice William Brennan filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, in which Justices Harry Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall joined. Id. at 132
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 147 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Id. at 132.
111. The Court followed the plurality in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986),
stating that "the identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law." Praprotnik, 485
U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion
of Brennan, J.)).
112. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 & n.1 (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 125-26 (plurality opinion).
114. See Welch & Hofmeister, Praprotnik, Municipal Policy and Policymakers: The Su-
preme Court's Constriction of Municipal Liability, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J. 857, 887 (1989).
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Justice William Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall
and Harry Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, but found the plural-
ity's theory of municipal liability overly narrow and unrealistic and ex-
pressed concern that municipalities would be able to insulate
themselves from almost all liability. 115 Justice Brennan stated that state
law would be an appropriate starting place to find where final decision-
making power lies, but that the law might not reflect the actual power
structure or may provide no answer at all.116 Justice Brennan concluded
that the fact finder must determine who actually has final authority
and not simply who the law says should have it."7
Unlike Justice Brennan, the plurality would not look beyond state
or local law to determine with whom final authority lies."8 This deci-
sion would seem to allow a municipality formally to retain the top tier's
power to review all decisions of its subordinates, thus making the mu-
nicipality liable only when the top tier approves of the decision and its
basis. 19 Recognizing this danger, the plurality stated that the custom or
usage doctrine precludes egregious attempts to insulate the municipal-
ity from liability.120 Apparently, therefore, formal review power will not
control if the subordinate's decision is so permanent and well settled as
to have the force of law.12 ' The plurality's rule should allow the plaintiff
in each case to present facts showing that the practice is widespread.
Both the plurality and Justice Brennan agree that state law is the place
to start. The plurality, however, requires that the practice be perma-
115. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that the
plurality requires the courts to refer exclusively to applicable state statutory law to identify munic-
ipal policymakers. See id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan claimed that "the
plurality cites no authority for this startling proposition, nor could it, for we have never suggested
that municipal liability should be determined in so formulaic and unrealistic a fashion." Id. at 143
(Brennan, J., concurring). The plurality, however, was citing Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Pembaur for the proposition that a final decisionmaker is to be identified by state law. See id. at
124 (plurality opinion) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion)). Justice Brennan re-
plied that no member of the Pembaur Court stated that reliance on extra-statutory sources would
be in any way improper. Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated that "the identification of policymak-
ing officials is not a question of federal law, and it is not a question of fact in the usual sense." Id.
(plurality opinion). The plurality did not explain what it meant by "in the usual sense," but it
appears to leave some room for considering facts in at least two situations discussed below. See
infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
119. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. (plurality opinion). Under the plurality's rule the trial judge is forced either to find
that the state law is an egregious attempt to evade liability, or to follow a state law he knows is
inaccurate but does not amount to an egregious attempt to evade liability. That big area between
egregious attempts to evade liability and state law that explicitly gives authority inevitably will be
decided incorrectly on occasion.
121. See id. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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nent and well settled, whereas Justice Brennan requires only that the
fact finder be convinced that the decisionmaker had actual final
authority.
Under either theory, establishing that a practice is permanent and
well settled necessarily would require that the particular decisionmaker
be shown to have exercised final authority many times.12 Some officials
may not make many final decisions in their careers, however, and as the
Court has noted, even the first victim of an official policy should be
entitled to recovery. 2 ' Consequently, the municipality should be liable
for the first deprivation caused by an official actually exercising final
authority.
The plurality stated that an elegant line may not be possible, 4 but
the line the plurality drew appears to be based on a distrust of the
jury.1 25 A better line can be drawn if it is based instead on the underly-
ing rationale for the final authority doctrine. The rationale requires
that a municipality will be liable only for authorized acts.1 6 State law
should not dictate whether an act is in fact authorized. If authorization
were a question of law, a municipality conceivably could avoid liability
by passing a law stating that officials are not authorized to commit ille-
gal acts, thus making any illegal act an unauthorized act. 2 7 The plural-
122. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
123. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that
the plurality's awareness that relying on the custom or usage doctrine to forestall only egregious
attempts by the municipality to evade liability would allow some deprivations for which the mu-
nicipality should be liable, but that the doctrine would prevent the most deliberate attempts by
the municipality to insulate itself from liability. Id. at 144 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan responded that § 1983 does not simply provide redress for most violations and is not
limited to violations that are egregious. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
125. See id. at 131 (plurality opinion). The plurality's distrust of the jury system is apparent
from statements like "[w]e cannot accept . . . that a jury should be entitled to define for itself
which officials' decisions should expose a municipality to liability." Id. This statement appears to
misconstrue the argument for allowing reference to facts, which does not allow the jury to "define"
final authority; it allows the jury to apply the Court's definition of final authority to the facts of
the case. See id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that juries should not be given open-
ended discretion; instead, they must find the predicate facts necessary to determine whether the
official has final authority). Another example is the plurality's statement that it would be capri-
cious "to hold a municipality responsible for every decision that is perceived as 'final' through the
lens of a particular factfinder's evaluation of the city's 'actual power structure.'" Id. at 124 n.1
(plurality opinion). The plurality seems to believe that the fact finder's "lens" often is distorted.
This distrust also prevents a judge, when sitting as finder of fact, from considering such facts. See
id. (plurality opinion). The plurality's effort to keep the facts from the jury underscores the egre-
gious facts frequently seen by the Court in municipal liability cases under § 1983, but does not
further § 1983's goal of preventing and compensating such deprivations.
126. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
127. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 145 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued
that under the plurality's approach "a municipal charter's precatory admonition against discrimi-
nation or any other employment practice not based on merit and fitness effectively insulates the
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ity rejected this argument128 and deferred the issue by stating that such
a flagrant attempt to reject all responsibility for the illegal acts of a
city's employees would present a different case than the one before the
Court in Praprotnik.129 Thus, the plurality apparently conceded that
state law is not the only source of final authority and that actual prac-
tice is relevant, at least in some cases.130 Therefore, although state law
is the place to begin the inquiry,' it may not settle the question of
who holds final authority.
The plurality expressed concern in Praprotnik that retaliation or
other personal goals motivated the subordinate's illegal decision.18 2
Under the final authority doctrine those random acts will not create
municipal liability.133 When one with final authority causes the depriva-
tion, however, randomness probably should not be considered.'3 In
sum, the underlying rationale for the final authority doctrine would
have the fact finder decide where final authority lies by referring to
state and local law as well as the facts in each case.
2. When Is Authority Final?
The plurality in Praprotnik reiterated that only a final decision
constitutes a municipal policy.13 5 Therefore, the plurality reasoned,
when a decision of an official is subject to review by the final deci-
sionmakers, the subordinate's decision is not final until a final deci-
sionmaker approves the decision and its basis. 36 The plurality
maintained that final authority is generally a question of state law,13 7
municipality from any liability based on acts inconsistent with that policy." Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
128. The plurality stated: "Refusals to carry out stated policies could obviously help to show
that a municipality's actual policies were different from the ones that had been announced." Id. at
131 (plurality opinion).
129. See id. (plurality opinion).
130. For all its effort to add predictability to municipal liability under § 1983, the plurality
has left open this crucial question. See id. (plurality opinion) (stating that "ad hoc searches for
officials possessing such 'de facto' authority would serve primarily to foster needless unpredictabil-
ity in the application of § 1983") (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
133. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
134. See id.
135. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that an offi-
cial's decision is not final if it is constrained by official policies because the final decisionmakers
establish municipal policy and any departure by the subordinate from such policy is not final. See
id. (plurality opinion).
136. Id. (plurality opinion).
137. See id. at 131 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that imposing municipal liability
for the mere exercise of discretion would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability.
Id. at 126 (plurality opinion).
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but allowed departures in two cases: First, when the formality sur-
rounding the subordinate's decision gives it the appearance of an official
policy statement and the supervising policymaker expressly approves
the decision's issuance,138 and second, when a subordinate official fre-
quently makes policy decisions so that the supervisor is on notice of the
conduct and cannot claim that it was random.13 9 Justice Brennan
agreed that retaining the power to review can prevent the subordinate's
decision from being final, but stated that the fact finder should consider
whether review power actually is exercised and whether the reviewing
authority actually could alter a decision in practice. 40
Under the final authority doctrine, a decision is authorized when it
is made or approved by an official with final authority to make such
decisions. At some point a decision either must become final, or must
be subject to approval by a final decisionmaker; therefore, the munici-
pality is liable if the final decisionmaker approved it,141 or could not
have changed it. 14
2
a. Retained Power to Review
The plurality in Praprotnik noted that if officials with final author-
ity could insulate the municipality from liability by delegating all of
their authority to subordinates, section 1983 could not serve its in-
tended purpose. 143 Under the plurality's formulation the municipality
would not be liable unless the official explicitly approved the decision
and its basis.14 4 This standard, however, allows the delegating authority
to avoid municipal liability by simply not approving the decisions ex-
pressly. The plurality's answer is that egregious attempts to insulate the
municipality are covered by the doctrine of custom or usage, which at-
tributes the decisions of subordinates to the municipality if a long-
standing practice of similar decisions has not been reviewed or actually
has been approved. 4 Arguably, a municipality could defeat the rule by
approving some decisions, particularly those that are unlikely to cause
deprivations. As Justice Brennan noted, section 1983 was not intended
to provide relief only for "most" violations, nor was it intended to reach
138. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
139. See id. (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 144-45 & n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
142. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
143. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126 (plurality opinion); Case Comment, supra note 63, at 245-46
(Pembaur's single-decision rule may cause municipalities to strip discretionary power from
subordinates).
144. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion).
145. See id. (plurality opinion).
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only egregious conduct. 46
The plurality in Praprotnik stated that acquiescing in the discre-
tionary decisions of a subordinate does not constitute a delegation of
policy-making authority. 147 It is unclear how the Court would apply this
reasoning in practice, but the plurality implied that a municipality
could escape liability even if a final decisionmaker is aware of an illegal
decision and is in a position to overrule it. Thus, the plurality's rule is
contrary to the rationale for the final authority doctrine, which would
impose liability for conduct of which the final decisionmaker had no-
tice. If a final decisionmaker knew of the decision, and could have over-
ruled it but did not, the municipality was as much on notice as if the
final decisionmaker made the decision. When a final decisionmaker
knows of the decision and acquiesces in it, it is fair to infer that the
decisionmaker has approved it. In this situation the conduct is neither
random-the final decisionmaker obviously expected it-nor unauthor-
ized-the final decisionmaker in fact approved the decision. The plural-
ity's requirement of explicit approval, thus, appears to be another
manifestation of its distrust of the jury because it does not allow the
jury to determine whether the decision was approved implicitly by the
final decisionmaker's acquiescence. 14  The final decisionmaker may
have approved the decisions with a wink and a nod that may be difficult
to prove-but the plaintiff ought to be given the chance.
b. Scope and Standard of Review
The plurality in Praprotnik noted the court of appeals' finding that
the Civil Service Commission-by statute the final deci-
sionmaker-exercised only circumscribed power to review the decisions
of alleged subordinates and, thus, gave substantial deference to those
officials. 149 The plurality stated that just because the review power is
circumscribed, the final decisionmaker is not deemed to have approved
the subordinate's decision. 150 Unfortunately, because it summarily re-
jected the idea that the failure to exercise review could be equated with
authorization, the plurality failed to expound its analysis of the review
power. The scope of the final decisionmaker's power to review, however,
is necessarily relevant. If the scope of an official's power is not matched
by a superior's power to review, the subordinate becomes a final deci-
sionmaker with respect to those areas in which he has authority to
146. Id. at 144 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
148. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
149. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 129 (plurality opinion) (citing 798 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (8th
Cir. 1986)).
150. See id. (plurality opinion).
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make decisions not subject to review. If the official has the power to
make a decision that cannot be changed, it is by definition final.
The standard of review is also relevant when determining review
power. If the final decisionmaker retains power to review the
subordinate's decisions, but is confined to a higher standard of review
than de novo, it must be determined whether the final decisionmaker
could have changed the decision. 151
C. The Final Decisionmaker Fails to Prevent a Deprivation that It
Could Have Prevented
A municipality sometimes can be liable for failing to prevent a dep-
rivation. The Supreme Court has considered this issue only in the con-
text of failure-to-train cases and has set a very high standard for
plaintiffs to meet. The Court in City of Canton v. Harris52 held that
the failure to train can lead to municipal liability only when training
was so obviously necessary to prevent the violation of constitutional
rights that municipal policymakers are perceived as indifferent to the
need. 5 The Court held that deliberate indifference is required to find a
municipality liable for such inaction. 1 5
The reason for the heightened standard is that municipal liability
attaches only when an official policy causes the deprivation.155 An offi-
cial policy is one deliberately chosen from various alternatives. 58 The
deliberate indifference cases, by contrast, involve inaction. Thus, the
Court has decided that the inaction must amount to more than mere
negligence to constitute an official policy. 5 7 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor also would impose municipal liability when policymakers fail
to limit police discretion, the exercise of which results in a known pat-
151. The court of appeals in Praprotnik relied in part on standard of review, but a plurality
of the Supreme Court found this to be an insufficient basis for finding liability in Praprotnik. Id.
at 117, 129 (plurality opinion) (citing 798 F.2d at 1173-75).
152. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
153. Id. at 392. The plaintiff claimed that the city's policy, allowing police officers to deter-
mine when persons in custody require medical treatment, deprived her of due process when she
was arrested. See id. at 381. The plaintiff fell down and passed out, but the police did not seek
medical attention for her. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the city was liable for failing to train
its officers properly. See id. at 382.
154. See id. at 389, 392.
155. See id. at 389.
156. See id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
157. See id. at 388 & n.7 (noting the division among the courts of appeals as to what degree
of fault must be evidenced by the inaction before municipal liability attaches). When "the need for
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights,. . . the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliber-
ately indifferent to the need." Id. at 390.
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tern of constitutional violations.158 The plaintiff also must prove that
the deficiency in training caused the deprivation. 159 Thus, the plaintiff
must prove that a different training policy would have prevented the
deprivation. 160
The Court's failure-to-train decisions are consistent with the un-
derlying rationale for the final authority doctrine.' 6' When the final
decisionmaker is aware of great potential for deprivations, but does not
take reasonable precautions to avoid injury, the municipality is on no-
tice and should be liable. The rule avoids liability for random conduct
by requiring that the failure to train likely will result in the violation of
constitutional rights. In determining whether an act is authorized, the
Court has struck a balance that falls somewhere between actual ap-
proval and custom or usage. This balance is necessary because the cases
involve inaction, which is not approval, and conduct not so permanent
and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage. 6 2 The Court
could extend this rationale beyond failure-to-train cases, although fail-
ure to train is the most frequently encountered problem resulting from
inaction.
After delaying resolution of the issue and making conflicting state-
ments,' the Court in Harris held that the policy itself need not be
unconstitutional.16  The Court concluded that if employees apply a
valid municipal policy illegally because they were trained improperly,
158. Id. at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 391.
160. See id.
161. See supra Part IV.
162. See infra subpart V(D).
163. The plurality in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (plurality opin-
ion), expressed no opinion on whether a municipality could ever be liable for a deprivation caused
by a constitutional policy, see id. at 824 n.7 (plurality opinion), but noted that for municipal liabil-
ity to attach, a plaintiff would have to prove that the policy caused considerably more than a single
deprivation. See id. at 823-24 (plurality opinion). The plurality thus would appear to require either
deliberate indifference by the policymakers, or a widespread and permanent practice that would
constitute a "custom or usage." See infra subpart V(D). Justice Brennan stated that he did not
understand the plurality's "metaphysical distinction between policies that are themselves uncon-
stitutional and those that cause constitutional violations." Id. at 833 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan concluded that when a municipality takes an action that causes a deprivation, §
1983 is an available remedy. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). The debate continued in City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
stated that the municipality is not liable unless there is an unconstitutional municipal policy. See
id. at 128 (plurality opinion). This position is in contrast to the plurality opinion Justice O'Connor
joined in Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 (plurality opinion), which stated that a municipality may be liable
for a constitutional policy under certain circumstances. See generally Welch & Hofmeister, supra
note 114, at 877. Justice Brennan replied in Praprotnik that this issue was not before the Court.
See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., concurring). The decision finally was made in
Harris.
164. Harris, 489 U.S. at 386-87.
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the municipality's failure to train caused the constitutional wrong, and
the municipality should be liable.16 This holding probably applies only
to cases of inaction by the final decisionmaker because the municipality
is liable only for actions of the final decisionmaker. 16 6 Thus, if a final
decisionmaker makes a policy and delegates the discretion to his subor-
dinates to carry it out, the final decisionmaker has authorized only con-
stitutional conduct. Any unconstitutional conduct by subordinates is
unauthorized and, thus, not attributable to the municipality.
D. A Practice Is So Widespread that It Constitutes a Custom or
Usage Representing Official Policy
A municipality can cause a deprivation by acquiescing in a practice
so permanent and well established that it constitutes a custom or usage
with the force of law.167 The Supreme Court has held that the text of
section 1983 mandates liability for this acquiescence should it result in
a deprivation of a federally protected right.168 This liability was pre-
sumably one of the most important aspects of the statute for fighting
discriminatory practices accepted, but never formally adopted, by city
officials. Acquiescence by government officials is at least as dangerous
as formally adopted rules. 69 This doctrine is most useful for combat-
ting more subtle but common forms of deprivation by persons acting
under color of state law.17 0 The plaintiff, however, must prove that the
practice is permanent and well settled, which means that other victims
also may have been deprived of their federally protected rights and de-
nied a remedy.'71
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.' 1 a Kress store in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi refused restaurant service to a white schoolteacher accom-
panying six young black students. 17 The students were served, but the
teacher was arrested and charged with vagrancy. 74 The Supreme Court
held that custom or usage means a practice engaged in by state officials;
it does not mean that a municipality is liable for acquiescing in the
165. See id.
166. See supra subpart m(C).
167. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970).
168. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
169. Such informal rules of conduct may be difficult to root out and may be more deeply
ingrained in the society. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.56 (stating that "[d]eeply embedded tradi-
tional ways of carrying out state policy.. . are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of
the written text" (quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940))).
170. See infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
171. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that a practice could be well settled without having
caused any deprivations; thus, even the first victim could be compensated.
172. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
173. Id. at 146-47.
174. Id.
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customs of its citizens, such as Kress.175 Justice Brennan contended
that any "widespread and long-standing practice, commonly regarded
as prescribing norms for conduct, and backed by sanctions" that need
not be imposed by the state constitutes custom or usage. 17 6 Justice
Brennan argued that section 1983 liability should fall on the municipal-
ity when "a person acts under color of a custom or usage of a State.1 77
This reading, however, may broaden the reach of section 1983 to cases
in which no state action whatsoever exists.
The underlying rationale for the final authority doctrine does not
justify municipal liability for random and unauthorized conduct.18 The
rationale, however, does support the imposition of liability on the mu-
nicipality when the conduct, although not authorized explicitly, is so
widespread that the final decisionmakers can be deemed on notice of,
and acquiescing in, illegal conduct.17 9 In Adickes it would be difficult to
find authorization unless the government's involvement went beyond an
arrest for vagrancy. The plaintiff would have to show that the final
decisionmaker knew of Kress's practices and authorized the officers to
arrest whites accompanying blacks in those situations.180 If the plaintiff
could show an illegal practice by the police, the conduct would not be
random and the final decisionmaker could be deemed to have author-
ized the conduct implicitly. The municipality certainly can be said to be
on notice when its employees engage in the practice, but when private
citizens are the only actors, the municipality may not be able to control
their activities sufficiently. This doctrine is useful in cases in which the
deprivation results from conduct that is too subtle to support a finding
that the final decisionmaker was deliberately indifferent to the rights of
those persons with whom subordinates come in contact. Acquiescence
in the subordinates' conduct by the final decisionmaker, rather than de-
liberate indifference, should suffice to impose municipal liability for
that custom or usage.
VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying rationale for the final authority doctrine is to avoid
municipal liability under section 1983 for random and unauthorized
conduct. This rationale distinguishes acts of the municipality from acts
175. See id. at 166-67.
176. Id. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. Moreover, the action must have been "under color of law," which means that a Kress
employee and a police officer must have had an understanding that whites who accompanied
blacks would be arrested or denied service. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
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of its employees by requiring that the deprivation result from a decision
made by a person authorized by the municipality to make such policies
and by requiring that the act be one that the municipality could have
prevented. If the municipality gave the official unreviewable power to
make policy decisions, it is on notice that deprivations may result. If
one of those decisions causes a deprivation, the municipality is at fault
for not preventing it. Therefore, as with claims for violations of proce-
dural due process, a municipality is not liable for the random and unau-
thorized acts of its employees.
A municipality can cause deprivations in several ways, and courts
should view each case through the rationale for the final authority doc-
trine. The Supreme Court has settled on the final authority doctrine,
but in some cases it has not agreed on how to apply the doctrine. This
Note submits that the Court could apply the doctrine more consistently
by referring to the underlying rationale when determining whether mu-
nicipal liability should attach in a given situation. Although the Court's
application generally is consistent with the rationale, the Court has de-
viated on occasion, especially in the area of determining final authority
as a matter of law.181 Anchoring the doctrine to its rationale will result
in a more consistent analytical framework for determining when the
municipality is at fault and, therefore, should be liable for any injuries
that result.
Steven E. Comer*
181. See supra subpart V(B)(1).
* The Author wishes to thank Professor Robert Belton for sharing his insight during the
development of this Note.
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